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This paper examines whether risk-based pricing promotes risk-reducing effort. Risk-based pricing is common
in private insurance markets but rare in government assurance programs. We analyze accidental underground
fuel tank leaks—a source of environmental damage to water supplies—over a 14-year period, using
disaggregated (facility-level) data and policy variation in financing the cleanup of tank leaks over time. The
data indicate that eliminating a state-level government assurance program and switching to private insurance
markets to finance cleanups reduce the frequency of underground fuel tank leaks by more than 20 percent.
This corresponds to more than 3,000 fuel tank release accidents forgone over 8 years in one state alone, a
benefit in avoided cleanup costs exceeding $400 million. These benefits arise because private insurers mitigate
moral hazard by providing financial incentives for tank owners to close or replace leak-prone tanks prior to
costly accidents.
Disciplines
Insurance
This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/oid_papers/245
325
[Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 54 (May 2011)]
 2011 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0022-2186/2011/5402-0012$10.00
Risk-Based Pricing and Risk-Reducing Effort:
Does the Private Insurance Market Reduce
Environmental Accidents?
Haitao Yin Shanghai Jiao Tong University
Howard Kunreuther University of Pennsylvania
Matthew W. White ISO New England Inc.
Abstract
This paper examines whether risk-based pricing promotes risk-reducing effort.
Risk-based pricing is common in private insurance markets but rare in gov-
ernment assurance programs. We analyze accidental underground fuel tank
leaks—a source of environmental damage to water supplies—over a 14-year
period, using disaggregated (facility-level) data and policy variation in financing
the cleanup of tank leaks over time. The data indicate that eliminating a state-
level government assurance program and switching to private insurance markets
to finance cleanups reduce the frequency of underground fuel tank leaks by
more than 20 percent. This corresponds to more than 3,000 fuel tank release
accidents forgone over 8 years in one state alone, a benefit in avoided cleanup
costs exceeding $400 million. These benefits arise because private insurers mit-
igate moral hazard by providing financial incentives for tank owners to close
or replace leak-prone tanks prior to costly accidents.
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1. Introduction
Many risks facing firms and individuals are spread across the economy through
government assurance programs. Prominent examples include bank deposit in-
surance, pension benefit guarantee funds, and hazardous material cleanup funds.
A salient feature of many government assurance programs is the absence of risk-
based pricing: they protect beneficiaries from adverse events for a price that does
not vary with the insured’s likelihood of loss. A common concern is that this
practice may exacerbate moral hazard, increasing the frequency of adverse events
by lessening incentives for risk-reducing effort (Kareken and Wallace 1978; Coo-
per and Ross 1998; Brown 2008).
In contrast, risk-based pricing is widely employed in private insurance con-
tracts.1 It can attenuate moral hazard problems by rewarding firms with premium
discounts for risk-reducing activities (Freeman and Kunreuther 1997; Boyd
1997). In this paper, we investigate whether the absence of risk-based pricing in
one class of government assurance programs results in less risk-reducing ac-
tivity—and more frequent adverse outcomes—than if comparable insurance is
arranged in private markets. The policy variation between states in financing
the cleanup of underground fuel tank leaks provides an important setting in
which to examine this question.
In the late 1980s, new federal regulations required gas stations and other
owners of underground fuel tanks to demonstrate that they are financially capable
of cleaning up underground fuel leaks and compensating third parties for con-
sequential damages. Michigan, Illinois, and Indiana soon created state assurance
programs to subsidize firms’ costs of complying with the new federal regulations.
Although the risk of an underground fuel tank leak varies greatly with a tank
owner’s operating and investment decisions, the price to participate in these
state cleanup assurance funds did not vary with the station’s risk. Consequently,
station owners could have costly tank leaks and their consequential damages
covered at the state’s expense, while facing little program-related incentives to
take care to prevent such leaks.
By the mid-1990s, the assurance funds in Michigan and Illinois became in-
solvent. However, these states took different approaches to their insolvency crises.
While Illinois increased its gasoline excise tax to restore its program’s solvency,
the Michigan legislature terminated its state assurance program. Tank owners in
Michigan subsequently turned to the emerging market for commercial cleanup
and liability coverage in order to comply with the federal financial responsibility
requirements. In contrast to state assurance funds, the price structure for market-
based insurance gives tank owners incentives to invest in equipment that reduces
the chance of accidental fuel tank leaks. This variation provides an opportunity
to evaluate whether switching from a government assurance program to the
1 By “risk-based pricing,” we mean insurance premiums that are based on an assessment of the
insured party’s risk of future losses and vary with the insured party’s loss history (experience rating).
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private insurance market promotes risk-reducing activity and reduces the fre-
quency of these adverse events.
Despite its importance, few studies directly evaluate the performance of
private- versus public-sector insurance programs in addressing moral hazard.
The empirical difficulty is that moral hazard is typically confounded with se-
lection effects. For example, Wheelock and Wilson (1995) find that banks that
were members of the Kansas state deposit insurance system had a higher prob-
ability of failure than did nonmembers. As they point out, however, it is unclear
whether insurance attracted the most risk-prone banks (adverse selection) or
banks tended to take more risks once insured (moral hazard).2
Several attributes make our research setting more conducive to the study of
moral hazard. First, the federal financial responsibility regulations require firms
either to purchase private insurance or to participate in a state assurance fund.
Because the two systems provide comparable insurance benefits but the cost of
a state’s fund is borne by taxpayers, it is a dominant strategy for any tank owner—
whether low or high risk—to use the state assurance fund. Only when a state
fund is not available do tank owners acquire private insurance. Consequently,
there is no sorting between private- and public-sector insurance based on a
firm’s private information about its risk propensity or its cost of risk-reducing
effort.
Second, there is little reason to take a reverse-causality interpretation of the
data, in which accident rates in Michigan would decline (relative to surrounding
states) even if that state did not switch to private-market insurance. In fact, the
available evidence indicates that Michigan should—and did—expect to have a
larger future tank cleanup problem than other states at the time that it closed
its public assurance program (Public Sector Consultants 1995). This makes it
difficult to interpret Michigan’s policy change as a consequence, rather than a
cause, of changes in accident rates.
The findings are quite striking. After Michigan’s policy change, the fraction
of underground fuel tanks with accidental releases dropped by more than 20
percent relative to surrounding states that maintained state assurance fund pro-
grams. This reduction corresponds to more than 3,000 fuel tank releases avoided
in Michigan over the following 8 years. At an average cleanup cost of $125,000
per release (Government Accounting Office 2007), this represents an aggregate
cleanup cost savings for that state on the order of $400 million.
These findings have a practical policy implication. The U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) estimates that 6,300 new underground fuel tank releases
occur each year in the United States (EPA 2010, p. 5). Gasoline and other
petroleum products that leak underground tend to enter groundwater flows; if
undetected, these leaks can pose a public health hazard by contaminating public
2 Empirical studies of private- versus public-sector insurance have proved more successful in
analyzing adverse selection, particularly in health care contexts. Hopkins and Kidd (1996) and Sapelli
and Torche (2001) argue that adverse selection is more severe for insurers that are restricted from
practicing price discrimination, which prevents premiums from varying with an insured party’s risk.
This content downloaded from 130.091.116.052 on June 27, 2016 14:23:31 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
328 The Journal of LAW& ECONOMICS
drinking water supplies that require costly remediation. For the more than 30
states that presently operate state assurance fund programs, adopting the risk-
based pricing mechanisms used in private insurance markets may reduce the
costly burden of future accidents and alleviate ongoing solvency crises.
2. Technology and Risk-Reducing Activity
To understand the effects of the government assurance programs that we study,
it is useful to briefly summarize the underlying technology, the risks it entails,
and what taking care to prevent accidents means in this setting.
2.1. Technology
Most underground fuel tanks are located at retail gasoline stations. A small
gas station typically has two tanks, and a large station may have five or six. From
regulatory and insurance standpoints, they are treated as one system consisting
of the tanks and underground piping, pumps, and ancillary equipment. The
most common and serious cause of accidental underground fuel leaks is long-
term corrosion (oxidation) of the tank or pipes, catalyzed by groundwater in
the surrounding soil.3
While leaks underground are not directly visible, they are readily detected by
several means. These include inventory monitoring and reconciliation, automatic
leak sensors located in the tank system, and groundwater- or soil-monitoring
wells located near the tank system. Since 1993, all tank systems in the United
States have been required to have some leak detection system in place. Tank
system owners can invest in more accurate detection systems than the minimum
regulatory requirement, which enables a leak to be identified and rectified more
rapidly.
Rapid detection of a leak is essential to minimize its cost and consequential
damage to water supplies and adjacent property. Small leaks can be resolved by
removing the remaining fuel, replacing the tank and piping, and cleaning (ex-
cavating or pumping) surrounding contaminated soil. Although total costs vary,
in the early to mid-1990s, typical cleanup costs in these situations ranged from
$60,000 to $100,000 (Environmental Information Digest 1993; Soesilo and Wilson
1997). In contrast, a leak that remains unresolved will not stop of its own accord
and tends to grow progressively worse over time, spreading into groundwater
systems beyond the station site. In severe cases, fuel from leaking tanks can
contaminate drinking water sources, forcing the permanent closure of municipal
and private wells and the acquisition of new water supplies.4 For these reasons,
investing in equipment and operating practices that can prevent accidental un-
3 Other causes include improper installation, structural collapse, and uncontained surface spills
during deliveries.
4 Benzene and other compounds in gasoline are hemotoxic and neurotoxic to humans in high
doses and carcinogenic with long-term, low exposure levels (Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease
Registry 2005). Benton (1990) examines cleanup costs for groundwater contamination.
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derground leaks—and detecting and remediating leaks with alacrity—is desirable
to minimize the total social costs of underground fuel storage.
2.2. Preventing Leaks: Maintenance and Capital Investment
Since the mid-1980s, new technologies have enabled tank system owners to
greatly reduce the likelihood of an underground fuel leak. Prior to 1990, nearly
all underground fuel tanks were single walled and constructed of bare steel that
is prone to corrode. Two types of capital investment can greatly reduce this risk.
The first, and most effective, is to replace a steel tank with one constructed of,
or coated with, noncorroding material (such as reinforced fiberglass). Installing
a double-walled tank further reduces the corrosion risk to negligible levels. Short
of replacing an existing bare steel tank, a tank system owner can invest in
corrosion-attenuating equipment that reduces the likelihood of underground
tank leaks. Several anticorrosion technologies are available, with more effective
systems carrying higher installation and ongoing maintenance costs (see EPA
2008).
Tank system leaks can also be reduced, in severity and in likelihood, through
assiduous operations and maintenance activities. These include regularly per-
forming pressure tests on the tank system, calibrating inventory-monitoring
systems after each fuel delivery, replacing underground sacrificial anodes (a com-
mon means of corrosion resistance in steel tanks), operating impressed-current
anticorrosion devices, and the like. All of these activities are costly, and some
require periodic closure of the station and attendant lost revenue.5
3. Regulation and Its Incentives
During the 1980s and 1990s, changes in federal and state regulations altered
the incentives for tank owners to undertake risk-reducing measures. We describe
these changes next.
3.1. Federal Regulations and Owners’ Responsibilities
In response to mounting scientific evidence of and public concern over the
adverse health consequences of leaking underground fuel tanks, in 1984 Congress
directed the EPA to regulate public and private underground fuel storage tanks.6
The EPA’s final regulations, issued in 1988, had three distinct provisions: financial
responsibility requirements, tank system technical standards, and disclosure and
corrective-action obligations. The first of these provisions is the impetus for the
state-level policy variation that we examine.
5 The technical literature on leak prevention practices is extensive (see, for example, Kreiger 2000;
Noyes 1992).
6 See 40 C.F.R. 280–81, which implements the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, subtitle
1, amendments of 1984. Underground fuel tanks were not a public concern until the early 1980s;
in 1983 a CBS 60 Minutes episode, “Check the Water,” brought national attention to the health
consequences of leaking underground gasoline storage tanks.
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3.1.1. Financial Responsibility Requirements
The EPA’s financial responsibility requirements enjoin tank system owners to
either purchase environmental liability and site remediation insurance for fuel
tank leaks from a qualified insurer, with a minimum coverage of $1 million per
occurrence, or participate in a state-administered underground storage tank
financial assurance program that provides comparable coverage.7 State and fed-
eral regulators believe that compliance with financial responsibility requirements
is (essentially) universal.8
In creating these new obligations, Congress did not alter any tort system
remedy available to third parties injured by a tank leak. Rather, Congress effec-
tively concluded that such remedies alone are apt to be administratively and
socially costly relative to prophylactic regulation and that the desired incentive
effect of a pure liability rule may be adversely tempered by the limited liability
provisions of the bankruptcy code (Boyd 1997).9 This second concern is par-
ticularly acute with respect to the risk posed by underground fuel storage tank
leaks at gasoline stations, as many are small businesses and the cost of cleaning
up a substantial leak can easily exceed the present value of a station’s profit
stream.10
3.1.2. Technical Requirements
Although changes in technical standards for tank systems are not the focus
of our analysis, they affect the data interpretation and merit brief discussion.
The EPA chose compliance deadlines for technical standards that differed for
new and existing (grandfathered) underground fuel tanks. Any new tank installed
after 1988 was required to have one or more leak detection systems and to meet
a basic requirement for corrosion resistance. In contrast, existing (grandfathered)
tanks were obligated to meet the leak detection technology requirement within
5 years (by December 1993) and the corrosion resistance requirement within 10
7 Large petroleum marketers can self-insure after satisfying stringent financial tests specified by
the EPA (40 C.F.R. 280.95). This is rare if a state assurance fund exists (EPA 1995) for the reasons
noted below.
8 Sammy Ng, Director, Office of Underground Storage Tanks, EPA, e-mail correspondence, May
19, 2006; Kevin Wieber, Hazardous Materials Storage Inspector Specialist, Michigan Department of
Environmental Quality, Waste and Hazardous Materials Division, e-mail correspondence, June 15,
2006.
9 The administrative inefficiency of a pure liability rule rests on the observation that tank leak
litigation centers on competing expert testimony in geology, epidemiology, engineering, and other
scientific areas that courts are often ill equipped to evaluate. In addition, Congress recognized that
time is of the essence in acting to resolve an underground fuel storage tank leak. This makes corrective
action and assured financing for it stipulated a priori by a regulatory agency preferable to the delay
of judicial decisions regarding cleanup programs made in the course of civil litigation or a bankruptcy
proceeding.
10 Questions commonly arise regarding the allocation of liability between owner and operator at
franchised gasoline stations. Effective liability varies depending on who holds title to the tank system
and provisions regarding these contingencies in the specific franchise agreement.
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years (by December 1998). The corrosion resistance requirement could be met
by retrofitting an existing steel tank with technology readily available in 1988.
The principal consequence of these technical standards is that, even in the
absence of state-level policy variation, we would expect the frequency of un-
derground tank leaks to decrease over time as older, substandard tanks are closed
or upgraded to meet the 1998 deadline.
3.1.3. Reporting and Corrective Action Requirements
The 1988 federal regulations stipulate that underground storage tank leaks of
any detectable quantity be promptly reported to federal and/or state regulatory
agencies and specify the required corrective actions in detail. Importantly for
our purposes, the penalty for failing to report a suspected underground tank
leak is extraordinarily high: $11,000 per day (42 U.S.C. 6991[e]). In Section 4.3,
we discuss this and other incentives facing owners to report and remediate tank
leaks. It is useful first to summarize state policy responses to these federal reg-
ulations.
3.2. States’ Responses: Government Assurance Funds
The federal financial responsibility requirements generated a storm of political
protest from gasoline retailers and small-business advocates. They argued that
many stations would not survive because private insurance was not widely avail-
able in the 1980s and was expensive when available (see Government Accounting
Office 1987; Boyd and Kunreuther 1997).11 In response to these political pres-
sures, many state legislatures created financial assurance funds for underground
fuel tank leaks.
State assurance funds function as a publicly financed insurance program for
tank owners. In the event of a tank leak, the state assurance fund pays for the
cost of cleanup at the site and third-party consequential damages. To participate
in a state assurance fund program, a tank system owner must pay a nominal
registration fee (typically $100 per tank per annum), comply with applicable
technical standards for tank systems, and promptly report (within 1 day) any
detected or suspected underground fuel leaks.
Two features of these programs are important. First, most states’ assurance
funds are financed by an incremental excise tax on motor fuel (typically about
1 cent per gallon). The nominal registration fee that a tank system owner pays
to participate in a state assurance fund is a small fraction of the actuarially fair
price of underground fuel leak cleanup and liability insurance. As a consequence,
in states with assurance fund programs, the participation rate is effectively 100
percent.
Second, the fee that tank owners pay to qualify for state fund benefits is the
11 Commercial insurers frequently declined to cover tank systems that did not meet the EPA’s new
technical standards, even though these standards were (nominally) not binding on grandfathered
facilities until 1998.
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same for everyone. It does not vary with respect to the age of the tank being
insured; tank capacity, prior leak history, and proximity to groundwater; whether
or not the tank system has been retrofitted with advanced corrosion protection
equipment; whether the tank is single or double walled; or any of a host of
quantifiable factors that directly affect the chance of a leak and the cost of
remediating it. Consequently, the structure of state fund programs provides little
incentive for an owner to invest in or maintain leak prevention equipment
beyond the minimum necessary to meet federal technical requirements.
Indeed, it is possible that state assurance fund programs in fact attenuate tank
owners’ incentives to comply with federal technical requirements. Our discus-
sions with regulatory officials indicate that while state assurance funds nominally
require participants to comply with federal technical standards, that requirement
is not well enforced. William Foskett, an official at the EPA’s Office of Under-
ground Storage Tanks, indicates how administrators view the problem:
Anecdotes that have come to my attention indicate that where a state has the authority
to limit coverage based on compliance, that authority is not necessarily exercised. With-
holding payment for noncompliance poses state fund administrators two very practical
problems: 1) both the owner/operator and state legislators tend to think of payment for
cleanups as an entitlement, except in the most egregious violations; and 2) the public
interest (public welfare) purpose of protecting the environment and health by cleaning
up release sites is not served if the public monies allocated for cleanups are not in fact
applied to accomplishing that public goal expeditiously. . . . Assured financing for clean-
ups is a higher goal than bringing non-compliers to justice.12
In practice, this perspective has a potential to create misaligned incentives for
tank owners to comply with tank system technical standards. Still, whether the
absence of strong incentives to prevent accidental leaks among state assurance
fund participants manifests in more adverse outcomes is an empirical matter.
We now turn to the policy variation that informs this question.
4. States’ Policy Variation and Market Insurance
4.1. State Assurance Fund Changes
The states that we examine—Michigan, Illinois, and Indiana—established sub-
stantively identical state assurance fund programs in 1988 or 1989. Indiana
initially chose a high (relative to subsequent claims) gasoline excise tax to finance
its assurance fund and has operated its program without major changes since
that time. However, claims in both Michigan and Illinois significantly exceeded
their initial funding levels and rendered both states’ assurance funds insolvent
by the mid-1990s.
In response, Illinois raised its (wholesale) motor fuels tax by .8 cent per gallon
12 William Foskett, Office of Underground Storage Tanks, Division of Cleanup and Revitalization,
EPA, e-mail correspondence, August 18, 2004.
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and continued to operate its state assurance fund. Studies performed in Michigan
at the time concluded that a significant ($234 million) increase in funding would
be necessary to restore that state’s fund solvency and meet existing claims (Public
Sector Consultants 1995). The analysis of future liabilities predicted more than
3,000 additional claims between March 1995 and December 1998. Facing public
opposition to further gasoline taxes, in 1994 the Michigan legislature elected to
close its state assurance fund program to new claims (Mich. Comp. Laws, secs.
324.21101–21563). All tank owners operating in Michigan needed to obtain
private-market insurance starting July 1, 1995.
4.2. Market Insurance and Incentives
Environmental liability and cleanup insurance for underground fuel tank re-
leases is available on similar terms from a number of commercial insurance
companies. In contrast to state assurance fund programs, these commercial in-
surance policies are explicitly structured to encourage risk-reduction efforts. For
example, insurance premiums reward owners for replacing tanks constructed of
corrosive-prone material (bare steel) and aging tanks. A review of major insurers’
policies indicates that the primary factors determining commercial tank insur-
ance premiums are the age of the tank system, tank and piping material and
coatings, construction (single or double walled), contents, capacity, and the
history of prior leaks at the facility.
Some evidence of the magnitudes involved is summarized in Tables 1 and 2.
Table 1 lists two rate factors for one major commercial environmental liability
insurer (Zurich in North America) (see also EPA 1997; Public Sector Consultants
1995). Base premiums vary with tank construction and age by a factor of 10,
from $185 per annum for a new, double-walled tank to $1,850 per annum for
a single-walled tank that is 35 years or older. As we show in Section 6.4, this
premium structure makes it cost-effective for facility owners to replace aging
tanks sooner with commercial insurance than with public insurance.
Similarly, commercial premium structures create economic incentives for fa-
cility owners to purchase leak-resistant equipment when they replace tank sys-
tems. For instance, the data in Table 1 imply that the 30-year present value (at
5 percent per annum) of the insurance premium savings from installing a double-
versus a single-walled tank exceeds $5,300. In practice, the procurement cost
differential between a basic single-walled (cathodically protected) steel tank and
a noncorroding double-walled composite (fiberglass and steel) tank of standard
size is approximately $2,600–$3,000; the latter carries a 30-year manufacturer
warranty against corrosion.13 Thus, for reasonable discount rates, commercial
13 Cost data are from interviews with four major tank manufacturers (Kennedy Tank & Manu-
facturing Co., Highland Tank Manufacturing, Modern Welding Co., and Palmer Manufacturing &
Tank, Inc.); price comparisons are for two widely available tank models (the STI-P3 UL58-rated
single-walled and STI Permatank F-922 double-walled composite) with a 6,000-gallon capacity. In-
stallation costs are similar.
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Table 1
Base Insurance Premiums by Tank Type and Age
0–5
Years
6–10
Years
11–15
Years
16–20
Years
21–25
Years
26–30
Years
31–35
Years
135
Years
Single walled 284–339 350–470 500–700 760–1,030 1,100–1,380 1,450–1,690 1,750 1,850
Double walled 185–221 228–302 320–356 365–426 441–509 441–509 526–582 620
Note. Values are dollars per tank per annum. Insurance premium information is for environmental
liability and tank pollution insurance per $1 million coverage with a $5,000 deductible. Data are from
Zurich in North America for 2004.
insurance pricing can make it economic to install higher quality (noncorroding)
tanks when a facility replaces them. Public insurance lacks similar incentives.
Table 2 shows insurance premiums for several common three-tank system
configurations of different vintages in 1997, which is approximately the midpoint
of our study period. Premiums vary significantly: lower premiums apply if owners
invest in tank and piping equipment that is less likely to corrode and for systems
with superior monitoring and inventory control. Similarly, Table 2 indicates that
commercial insurance premiums are reduced for additional corrosion protection
equipment and other preventive measures that exceed federal technical standards.
Experience-rated prices for commercial insurance contracts provide additional
incentives for tank owners to take care. A prior accidental fuel release (a tank
leak or a surface spill exceeding 25 gallons) increases the premium per tank
charged by Zurich in North America by 10 percent (for closed claims) to 20
percent (for open claims) per annum. To our knowledge, no state assurance
fund program incorporates experience rating—the most basic form of risk-
related information—into its program participation fee. Commercial insurers
also provide incentives for tank owners to purchase detection and maintenance
services from specific third-party providers, an arrangement that insurers view
as a means to reduce moral hazard in gasoline retailers’ maintenance and op-
erations activities (see, for example, National Petroleum News 1998).
In sum, because the price of commercial insurance is closely tied to tank
systems’ attributes, leak history, and risk-reducing activities at the station level,
we hypothesize that stations with commercial insurance are less likely to have
accidental fuel tank leaks than stations participating in state assurance fund
programs. Before turning to the data that inform this conjecture, however, it is
important first to describe how leaks are reported.
4.3. Leak Disclosure Compliance
The data that we examine include all underground tank fuel leaks and spills
(formally known as accidental releases) reported to—or discovered by—state
regulatory agencies and commercial insurers. The issue that we confront is
whether the true number of releases discovered by tank system owners differs
from the reported number of releases. This poses a concern for our study if
underreporting is more prevalent with private insurance than public insurance.
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Table 3
Regulatory Compliance and Facility Inspection Rates
Michigan Illinois Indiana
Tanks inspected annually (actual) (%) 30–40 30–40 10–20
Frequency of state UST inspections (nominal) 3 Years 2 Years 3 Years
Active tanks with required leak detection equipment (%) 91–95 91–95 91–95
Full-time employees who conduct field UST inspections 21 23 6
Note. UST p underground storage tank.
Three observations argue against this possibility. (1) The likelihood that an
unreported release is ultimately detected is high. (2) The costs imposed by the
marketplace and the legal system upon discovery of an unreported release are
severe. (3) The costs of reporting an insured accidental release are comparatively
small. These observations suggest that a tank owner’s interests are best served
by reporting and cleaning up any leaks promptly, regardless of insurance system.
As to observation 1, there are two mechanisms at work: routine inspections
and on-site testing when a tank is replaced or a facility is closed. Table 3, which
summarizes information from a General Accounting Office (2000) study of state
tank regulations during the 1990s, indicates that Michigan and Illinois inspected
between 30 and 40 percent of facilities in each state annually; Indiana inspected
somewhat fewer (between 10 and 20 percent). A primary purpose of routine
state inspections is to detect previously unreported leaks. In addition, when a
facility owner closes or replaces a tank, state regulators require its removal and
inspection for leaks. The site assessment at closure is designed to be diagnostic
and highly unlikely to erroneously conclude that a site is clean if a release has
in fact occurred.
With regard to observation 2, market mechanisms provide considerable in-
centive to report and clean up leaks. It is standard practice for a prospective
buyer of any site with underground fuel storage tanks to have the site tested
prior to purchase (via direct soil sampling and monitoring of wells). A facility
that does not test clean is difficult, if not impossible, to sell and to be insured
by a future owner (absent cleanup). Consequently, unless the market value of
the site is already negligible before an accidental release, it is in the facility owner’s
best interest to have any leak cleaned up promptly—at the current insurer’s
expense—so as to preserve the asset’s future value.
Separately, failing to report an accidental release has significant legal conse-
quences. First, as noted earlier, federal law stipulates that a tank owner or operator
who fails to report a suspected accidental release within 24 hours is subject to
civil penalties of $11,000 per day. Second, to renew commercial tank insurance,
a facility owner must make a detailed declaration of whether it experienced an
accidental release in the past. Nondisclosure of a prior release is a breach for
which the insurer may legally rescind coverage, leaving the tank owner liable
for the full cost of the cleanup. In contrast, by reporting the release promptly,
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a facility owner can avoid this loss and have the release cleaned up at the insurer’s
expense.
As for observation 3, the owner of an insured facility bears some costs after
an accidental release occurs. However, much of this cost is the same under either
insurance system. The major costs to the owner are the insurance policy de-
ductible, future increases in experience-rated commercial premiums, any un-
insured losses associated with business interruption during cleanup, and the cost
of accelerated replacement of the tank system. Since public insurance programs
do not cover losses due to business interruption or the cost of new equipment,
only the experience rating and (potentially) the deductible amounts differ be-
tween commercial and public insurance systems.
Although hard data on the prevalence of unreported tank leaks remain elusive,
the totality of these considerations leaves us skeptical that tank owners with
private insurance are systematically less likely to report an accidental release than
owners participating in state assurance fund programs.14 Similarly, EPA officials
who oversee compliance policies nationally assert that there is no evidence that
tank owners using state assurance funds and those using commercial insurance
differ in reporting accidental releases.15
5. Data and Measurement
5.1. Data
We examine accidental release rates over a 14-year period at all facilities in
Michigan, Illinois, and Indiana. Using these states is informative for several
reasons. First, as noted earlier, all three states adopted substantively identical
assurance fund programs at the same time (either in 1988 or 1989). Second,
each of these states maintains comprehensive data on all underground fuel stor-
age tanks and accidental releases in the state. These databases have been con-
tinuously updated for more than 20 years as old tanks exit and new tanks enter
service.16 Third, as indicated in Table 3, these states’ on-site inspections of tank
facilities show a similarly high rate of compliance (between 91 and 95 percent)
14 In fact, it is conceivable that reporting might increase after a state switches to commercial
insurance, since private insurers provide financial incentives (premium discounts) for station owners
to install more sophisticated leak detection systems and to use third-party leak-monitoring services.
15 Sammy Ng, Director, Office of Underground Storage Tanks, EPA, e-mail correspondence, May
25, 2005; Mark Barolo, Deputy Director, Office of Underground Storage Tanks, EPA, e-mail cor-
respondence, May 25, 2005.
16 The EPA also maintains a national Underground Storage Tank Performance Measures database
(http://www.epa.gov/oust/cat/camarchv.htm) of underground storage tanks and releases, based on
data voluntarily supplied by state regulatory agencies. Couch and Young (2001, p. 18) report that
this national database contains errors and inconsistencies for numerous states that are extensive
enough to “compromise the validity of regression analyses performed on it.” This shortcoming of
the national data motivates our attention to three states that maintain higher quality data on tanks
and release events.
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Table 4
Facility Statistics and Trends by State
Michigan Illinois Indiana
Vehicle-miles traveled, 1990 (billions) 81.1 83.3 53.7
Growth rate (%) 2 2 2
Active facilities, 1990 25,253 22,809 17,089
Growth rate (%) 7 7 6
Average tanks per facility, 1990 2.8 2.7 2.4
Growth rate (%) .2 .8 .4
Average tank capacity, 1990 (gallons) 4,428 4,732 4,248
Growth rate (%) 5 4 5
Median active tank age (years)
1990 14 11 10
2003 16 13 13
Source. U.S. Department of Transportation (1990, table VM-2; 2003, table VM-2).
Note. Growth rates are average annual compound rates from 1990 to 2003. Tank-level attributes are
means for active facilities.
with leak detection system installation requirements. Last, these neighboring
states have similar climates, a contributing long-term factor to tank corrosion.
Two databases are maintained by each state’s environmental protection and
tank regulatory agencies. One is the tank database, which reports a tank’s in-
stallation date, closure date (if applicable), facility, and location. The second
database contains information on all reported releases in the state, including the
facility, release date, and cleanup progress. A central feature of all three states’
databases is that they retain information on tanks closed since 1986. Information
on closed facilities allows us to avoid attrition and survivor biases that would
otherwise confound measurement of release rate changes over time. In total,
there are approximately 236,000 individual underground fuel storage tanks in
the data.17
Our analysis of release rates is conducted at the facility level. Release data
record only the facility at which a leak occurs, not which individual tank (if any)
at the facility had a leak. This is a technological limitation: leak detection systems
often do not distinguish which tank is leaking if several are located near the
detector, and leaks can occur in piping systems rather than from a specific tank.
The states that we examine began collecting comprehensive release data in 1990,
after implementation of their assurance fund programs.
Table 4 summarizes facility attributes and trends by state. Michigan and Illinois
are quite similar with respect to the number of facilities with underground fuel
storage tanks, vehicle-miles traveled (an indicator of fuel storage demand), and
most tank-level attributes. Indiana, which has two-thirds as many residents, has
commensurately fewer facilities and vehicle-miles but similar tank-level attrib-
17 The data (and state and federal tank insurance regulations) also cover underground fuel storage
tanks at airports, railroad yards, car dealerships, municipal service lots, manufacturing plants, and
other sites. Federal law excludes residential heating-oil tanks from financial responsibility regulations;
they are not in our data.
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utes. All three states exhibit similar growth rates (within 1 percentage point) on
these dimensions over our 14-year study period. One noteworthy difference in
Table 4 is that Michigan’s tanks are slightly older than tanks in adjacent states.
We return to this in Section 6.3.
A striking feature of the data is the dramatic facility exit rate in all three states.
Sixty-five percent of the active facilities in Michigan in 1990 closed permanently
over the following 14 years. Entry was slight over this period, resulting in a net
facility exit rate of 61 percent from 1990 through 2003. Net exit rates are similarly
high in Illinois and Indiana over the same period (61 and 56 percent, respec-
tively). There was also a trend toward larger stations: the mean tank capacity of
active facilities increased steadily over time, by 4–5 percent per year. These trends
mirror the industry’s view that only the most profitable, high-volume gas stations
can cover the fixed cost of upgrading their tank systems to meet the regulatory
requirements phased in during the 1990s.
5.2. Measuring Facilities’ Release Risk
The empirical task is to measure how accidental release rates changed in
Michigan relative to other states after Michigan’s policy change. To do so, we
compute two measures of accidental release risk. These two measures are dis-
tinguished by whether or not they condition on a facility’s status. A facility’s
status is active if it has at least one active tank; otherwise, the facility is closed.
We classify a tank as active from installation date until closure as recorded by
state regulatory agencies.18
These distinctions are important because there are two margins on which a
facility owner might respond to risk-based insurance pricing. One is to make
capital investments and improve maintenance practices, as described in Section
2.2, that reduce the chance of a tank system leak. Such actions are not obligatory,
however; a station owner might choose to pay higher insurance premiums and
not undertake any risk-reducing activities. The second is that a station owner
might opt to close a leak-prone facility entirely. This avoids the need for ad-
ditional capital expenditures and/or higher insurance expenses after a state re-
quires commercial insurance, and it will be preferred if these expenses are high
relative to the station’s profit stream.
Our data enable us to determine whether the policy shift to risk-based pricing
affected only release rates at active facilities or whether it manifests primarily
through the closure of facilities. To be precise, some notation is useful: let Aft
indicate if the status of facility f in year t is active and indicate if an accidentalRft
release occurs.19 A state’s total release rate in year t is , where the probabilityP(R )ft
18 This definition mirrors regulatory practice: closure requires a tank to be removed from the
ground (or rendered unusable in situ), an on-site assessment, and approval from a state tank reg-
ulatory agency to terminate insurance requirements. Tanks that are de facto unused but have not
been officially closed are still subject to insurance, leak-monitoring, and leak-reporting requirements.
19 The term indicates at least one release in year t. However, it is exceptionally rare for a facilityRft
to report more than one release in the same year.
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P corresponds to drawing a facility at random from the population of all (active
and closed) facilities in the state. A state’s active release rate is , theP(R dA )ft ft
chance that an active facility has an accidental release. Because we observe the
history of closures and releases at both active and closed facilities, we measure
these rates directly from the data:
number of facilities with a release in year t
ˆP(R )p (1)ft total number of facilities
and
number of active facilities with a release in year t
ˆP(R dA )p . (2)ft ft number of active facilities in year t
These two measures are related by Bayes’s law, which implies
P(R )p P(R FA )P(A ) P(R and ∼A ), (3)ft ft ft ft ft ft
where ∼ indicates a nonactive (closed) facility. The last term on the right inAft
equation (3) is nonzero but an order of magnitude smaller than the total release
rate. (Newly discovered releases at closed facilities are rare but can occur if a
site is retested before redevelopment.) As a result, changes in the total release
rate are overwhelmingly determined by changes in the active release rate,P(R )ft
, and active status rate, .P(R dA ) P(A )ft ft ft
One implementation issue is to define the population of facilities, the de-
nominator in equation (1). The databases that we employ contain reliable in-
formation for (that is, a census of) tanks in the ground after 1986, when reporting
requirements for underground fuel tanks were first implemented (40 C.F.R.
280.22). In contrast, it is not possible to know (with any accuracy) how many
tanks were removed in the 1970s or earlier. Cognizant of this, we define the
total facility population as the set of facilities that were active at least once after
1986. According to this definition, if a facility was closed and had all its tanks
removed before 1986, it is excluded from the population and from our analyses.
This restriction is unlikely to materially affect our conclusions regarding the
effects of risk-based insurance pricing, as a decision to close a facility before
1986 amply predates any of the tank regulations, insurance requirements, and
state policies studied here.
One limitation of the data is that for some tanks we do not observe the
installation year or, to a lesser extent, the closure year. Specifically, installation
dates are missing for 14 percent of the tanks in Michigan, 53 percent in Illinois,
and 64 percent in Indiana (see Table A1). While this does not impair measure-
ment of the number of releases, it does complicate measurement of release rates.
We address this issue using a stratification and imputation procedure. The basic
idea is that if a particular tank closed in year s but its installation date is un-
recorded, we set the tank’s active-status indicator, , , equal to the relativeA t ! sit
frequency of active status among all tanks in the state that closed in the same
year but have an observed installation date. This yields a time-varying estimated
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probability in place of the unobserved active or closed status of the tank. We
use this probability to compute the facility-level active status counts in equation
(2). The precise imputation procedure, which conditions on additional facility
characteristics, is detailed in the Appendix.
This probabilistic imputation procedure rests on a conditional independence
assumption: the conditional distribution of tanks’ installation years in a state,
given the observed closing year, is the same whether or not the installation year
was recorded in the data. Some support for this assumption comes from dis-
cussions with state database administrators in Illinois, who indicated that a major
reason for missing data is that the missed information “may not have been
processed yet.”20 This suggests that missing installation dates (in Illinois) may
well be random or at least unrelated to a tank’s release propensity. However, in
the Indiana data, it appears that observed installation and closure dates are for
disproportionately newer tanks (installed from the 1990s onward). This does not
affect the usefulness of the Indiana data on total releases, but it means that the
data for Indiana relating to facility status and tank age should be interpreted
cautiously. Overall, we place our primary emphasis on comparisons between
Michigan and Illinois, with comparisons to Indiana serving as supplemental
corroborative evidence.
6. Results
This section presents empirical evidence indicating that after the policy change
to a private insurance market, overall release rates fell in Michigan by 20 percent
more than in adjacent states. The data also suggest that after the change, tank
owners in Michigan tended to take more care to prevent leaks than owners in
Illinois or Indiana.
6.1. Changes in Total Release Rates
Table 5 summarizes the three states’ average annual release rates before and
after 1995, when Michigan switched to private insurance. It omits 1995 because
Michigan’s policy change took effect midyear (we present 1995 separately below).
The data indicate that, on an average annual basis, Michigan’s total release
rate fell from 6.51 to 2.56 per 100 facilities before versus after the policy change,
a drop of 60.6 percent. By contrast, the total release rate in Illinois was lower
initially and declined by less: 5.23 to 2.82 per 100 facilities, a reduction of 46.2
percent. The ratio of relative risk changes (60.6/46.2), known generally as the
etiologic ratio, is 1.31. It indicates that Michigan’s relative risk reduction exceeded
that of Illinois by 31 percent. The relative risk reduction in Michigan exceeded
that in Indiana by a similar amount, 24 percent.
Reductions in environmental risks should also be considered in absolute terms.
20 Jan Spoor, database administrator, Illinois Office of State Fire Marshall, e-mail correspondence,
May 19, 2005.
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Table 5
Changes in Total Release Rates over Time, by State
Releases per 100 Facilities Absolute Risk Reduction Relative Risk Reduction
Pretransition
(1990–94)
Posttransition
(1996–2003) Post – Pre
Contrast with
Michigan
Post versus
Pre Etiologic Ratio
Michigan 6.51 2.56 3.95 60.6
(.09) (.06) (.10) (1.0)
Illinois 5.23 2.82 2.42 1.53 46.2 1.31
(.09) (.06) (.11) (.15) (1.5) (.05)
Indiana 3.62 1.84 1.77 2.18 49.0 1.24
(.09) (.06) (.11) (.15) (2.2) (.06)
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses and assume a (symmetric) misclassification error rate of 5 percent.
Relative risk reduction (RRR) is . The etiologic ratio is .post pre MICH OtherState100 # (rate /rate  1) RRR /RRR
On an average annual basis, Michigan’s total release rate fell by 3.95 per 100
facilities after its policy change. In contrast, the total release rate in Illinois
declined by only 2.42 per 100 facilities. The absolute risk reduction in Michigan
exceeds that in Illinois by 1.53 (or ) releases per 100 facilities, which3.95 2.42
is 23 percent of Michigan’s initial (1990–94) average annual release rate.
Is a reduction of 1.53 releases per 100 facilities economically significant? Yes.
The number of facilities in Michigan after its policy change averages approxi-
mately 26,000 (see Section 6.2). An annual reduction of 1.53 releases per 100
facilities corresponds to about 400 fewer accidental releases per year and ap-
proximately 3,200 fewer releases over our 8-year posttransition study period.
Table 5 also indicates that Michigan’s excess absolute risk reduction (the dif-
ference in differences) is even greater than that of Indiana. Taken together, these
data suggest that Michigan had some 3,000–4,000 fewer underground tank leaks
over the 8 years following its policy change than the number predicted by
neighboring states’ experience over the same period. Given an average cleanup
cost of $125,000 per release (Government Accounting Office 2007), this rep-
resents an aggregate cleanup cost savings for Michigan that is on the order of
$400 million over 8 years.
Figure 1 shows the annual differences in total release rates for Michigan and
Illinois. The greater drop in Michigan’s pre- versus posttransition release rate,
relative to the change in Illinois’s rate, is not driven by the data for any one
particular year. Michigan’s total release rate was consistently higher than that of
Illinois through 1995. The difference in release rates decreases in 1996, after
Michigan requires private insurance. (A decrease is also observed in 1993, the
year of the federal deadline to install or upgrade leak detection at grandfathered
facilities. All states’ release rates decreased that year, Michigan’s slightly more
than the others.) After Michigan’s policy change in 1995, its release rate not
only falls relative to that of Illinois but is actually lower than the rate in Illinois
most years thereafter.
Are these differences statistically significant? Since we have a census of the
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facilities in each state, the principal source of error is likely misclassification or
mismeasurement. If binary outcomes are recorded with misclassification errors,
the standard error (of the mean) is a concave function of the misclassification
probability. For our sample sizes, the former is bounded above by approximately
.0014. (This assumes independent errors across facilities.) That means that even
with extraordinary measurement error in recording release events—say, a 50
percent error rate—differences in observed release rates larger than about .3 per
100 facilities are statistically significant. In administrative data like these, mis-
classification rates of 50 percent stretch credulity; the standard errors that we
report in Table 5 are based on a lower misclassification rate of 5 percent. Adjusting
for within-facility correlation in release events over time (that is, clustering on
facility) yields de minimus changes in the standard errors, as few facilities have
more than one release during the 14-year span of our data.
6.2. Mechanisms
Why did accidental release rates decrease more in Michigan than in neigh-
boring states after 1995? Conceptually, it is useful to distinguish among three
possible mechanisms.
1. Because releases at closed facilities are rare, shifting facilities from active
to closed status tends to reduce a state’s overall release rate. A greater facility
closure rate in Michigan—for any reason—tends to reduce its total release rate
more than that of neighboring states.
2. There is greater selective attrition of the most leak-prone facilities into
closed status in Michigan than in adjacent states. Note that selective attrition
may reduce release rates in Michigan more than in other states, even if overall
facility exit rates are similar—that is, even if explanation 1 does not hold.
3. There is greater risk-reducing effort at active (surviving) facilities in Mich-
igan than in adjacent states. Tangibly, this means replacing or relining older
tanks, improving maintenance practices, installing anticorrosion equipment, and
similar activities after Michigan’s insurance policy change.
Explanation 1 is potentially problematic for conclusions about the role of
insurance pricing. Conceivably, high closure rates for gas stations during the
1990s could have come about for a number of reasons unrelated to insurance
reform: adverse demand conditions, the federal tank system technical standards
phased in during the 1990s (see Section 3.2), the industry’s trend to replace
smaller stations with larger facilities that have convenience stores, and so on.
These pose a potential concern if they resulted in higher facility closure rates in
Michigan than in comparison states after 1995. We consider this possibility in
light of the data next and explanations 2 and 3 subsequently.
6.3. Facility Closings
Figure 2 displays the total numbers of facilities and active facilities from 1986
to 2003 in Michigan and Illinois. A state’s total number and active number of
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facilities are the same in 1986, when record-keeping requirements began. In both
states, the total number of facilities grew incrementally over time because of
modest de novo entry by new gasoline stations. However, the number of active
facilities plummeted in both states. The decline in Indiana’s active facilities is
substantively the same (see Table 2).
Figure 2 reveals several important points. First, the decline in the number of
active facilities commenced in 1988–89, when the EPA issued its final regulations
regarding financial responsibility requirements (effective in 1988) and tank tech-
nical requirements (effective a decade later, in 1998, for existing facilities.) Sec-
ond, there is an abrupt drop in the number of active facilities in Illinois (and
in Indiana) in 1999, the year that grandfathering of existing facilities ended. We
do not observe an abrupt decline in Michigan at the same time, which indicates
that most of its grandfathered facilities had either exited or been upgraded by
then. Third, there is a slightly greater rate of de novo entry in Illinois than in
Michigan. Since newly installed tanks are unlikely to corrode, this difference in
entry rates should tend to reduce the overall release rates in Illinois relative to
Michigan over time. That is, the difference in new entry rates does not help
account for Michigan’s greater drop in release rates; it makes Michigan’s greater
decline more remarkable.
Last, and perhaps most important, there is little evidence that closure rates
in Michigan exceeded those in Illinois. From 1990 to 2003, the proportion of
facilities that were active—that is, in equation (3)—declined by essentiallyˆP(A )ft
identical amounts in both states: 56 percentage points (from .90 to .34) in
Michigan and 57 percentage points (from .88 to .31) in Illinois. The proportion
of active facilities decreased 59 percentage points (from .97 to .38) in Indiana
over the same period, nearly the same as in Michigan.
These data support two intermediate conclusions: the net exit of stations in
Michigan over time was not induced by that state’s private-market insurance
requirement in 1995, and the difference in absolute risk reduction between
Michigan and its neighbors is not attributable to a greater rate of facility closure
over time in Michigan. The second implication is important, as it argues against
the possibility that there exist confounding factors—that is, something other
than insurance reform—that caused different changes in release rates between
states by inducing different facility closure rates.
It is (perhaps) puzzling that Michigan’s overall closure rate from 1996 to 2003
is essentially the same as in Illinois and Indiana. After all, the cost of operating
a facility in Michigan rose in mid-1995; why was there not greater exit after a
cost shock? The likely explanation lies in the magnitudes. Gasoline retailing
entails an up-front sunk cost (upward of $100,000–$200,000 for initial site ac-
quisition and development), which owners expect to recoup on annual gross
margins. Insurance cost increases of $1,000–$3,000 annually (Table 2) are too
small to make this expected annual gross margin negative and so are unlikely
to induce exit among compliant facilities.
Of course, the cost of commercial insurance for older, noncompliant facilities
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could be substantially higher (if available at all; see note 11). That might drive
out marginally profitable noncompliant establishments and induce more prof-
itable ones to accelerate replacement of leak-prone tanks to reduce their insurance
premiums. This may explain why Michigan’s exit rate declines steadily over 1995–
99, as shown in Figure 2, but Illinois exhibits an abrupt drop in the number of
active facilities in 1999. Both states’ noncompliant facilities could not operate
after the federal grandfathering provision expired in 1998 (without costly up-
grades), but in Illinois there was less incentive to close a noncompliant facility
before 1998.
6.4. Changes in Active Release Rates
Explanations 2 and 3 in Section 6.2 point to the possibility of changes in
release rates at active facilities as a result of insurance reform. Table 6 summarizes
each state’s active facility release rate, or in equation (2). NoteˆP(R F A p 1)ft ft
that this is not a fixed set of establishments; the number of active facilities declines
steadily over time (Figure 2).
After 1995, Michigan’s active release rate falls by 3 percentage points. By
contrast, Illinois’ release rate declines by slightly more than 1 percentage point,
and Indiana’s falls by less than 1. The excess absolute risk reduction among
active facilities in Michigan versus Illinois is 1.78 per 100 facilities, and 2.09 per
100 facilities compared to Indiana.
Changes in active facility release rates and total release rates are mechanically
related: a greater decline in Michigan’s total release rate compared to other states
implies a greater decline in its active facility release rate, and vice versa. (This
follows from equation [1] and two facts: facility closure rates are similar in
Michigan and Illinois [Table 4 and Figure 2], and changes in releases at closed
facilities are negligible.)21 Thus, the information content in Table 6 lies primarily
in its interpretation.
Because the set of active facilities declines steadily over time in each state,
changes in active-facility release rates may arise from two conceptually different
mechanisms. The first is direct risk-reducing effort at facilities that continue to
operate (explanation 3 in Section 6.2), which involves investment in risk-reducing
technologies and their maintenance. Alternatively (or in combination), selective
attrition of the most leak-prone active facilities over time would result in a
progressively lower risk set of surviving active facilities. Note that the latter
mechanism would reduce active release rates, as measured in Table 6, even if
firms made no effort to reduce release risks at ongoing establishments.
21 In the data, the release rate at closed facilities in Michigan during 1990–94 is .0027, and during
1996–2003 it is .0018, a decrease of nine releases for every 10,000 closed facilities. The decrease in
the release rate at closed facilities in Illinois is less than one release per 10,000 closed facilities, and
there is a small increase for Indiana of nine releases for every 10,000 closed facilities. For all three
states, the changes in release rates at closed facilities are 2 orders of magnitude smaller than the
changes in the total and active release rates, which is far too small to explain the overall decline in
either.
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Table 6
Changes in Active Facility Release Rates over Time, by State
Releases per 100 Facilities Absolute Risk Reduction Relative Risk Reduction
Pretransition
(1990–94)
Posttransition
(1996–2003) Post – Pre
Contrast with
Michigan
Post versus
Pre Etiologic Ratio
Michigan 8.81 5.78 3.03 34.4
(.11) (.10) (.15) (1.4)
Illinois 5.74 4.48 1.25 1.78 21.8 1.58
(.10) (.10) (.14) (.21) (2.3) (.18)
Indiana 4.20 3.26 .95 2.09 22.5 1.53
(.10) (.10) (.14) (.20) (3.0) (.21)
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses and assume a (symmetric) misclassification error rate of 5 percent.
Relative risk reduction (RRR) is . The etiologic ratio is .post pre MICH OtherState100 # (rate /rate  1) RRR /RRR
Which of these mechanisms accounts for the larger reduction in release rates
in Michigan, relative to those in other states, after its policy change? Ideally, the
most compelling data to address this question are information on facility-level
investments in specific risk-reducing technologies (such as corrosion protection
equipment, tank relinings, maintenance logs showing more frequent pressure
testing, and so on) before and after 1995. To our knowledge, such data have not
been systematically collected, and it is far from clear that they could be assembled
reliably in retrospect. Nevertheless, we can draw useful inferences about whether
these activities must have occurred by examining surviving and attriting facilities
separately.
6.5. Continuously Operated Facilities
The majority of the facilities that were active at the end of our study period
were active since (at least) 1990. Table 7 summarizes the average annual release
rates for these continuously operated facilities.22 The average annual release rate
in Michigan decreases by 4.57 releases per 100 facilities after 1995. In contrast,
the rate in Illinois falls by about half as much. The situation in Indiana is similar
to that in Illinois. In both absolute and relative terms, the reduction in Michigan’s
release risk exceeds that in Illinois and Indiana. These magnitudes are substantial,
greater than the excess absolute risk reduction and etiologic ratios for facilities
overall (Table 5).23
The facilities in Table 7 are unlikely to be representative of all facilities, as
surviving facilities are apt to be more profitable than average. Still, these facilities
operated underground fuel storage tanks in the same location, with the original
22 Tables 7 and 8 omit facilities operating in 2004 for which operational status in 1990 is unknown
because of missing data for year of tank installation. Similar calculations (omitted) treating these
facilities as continuously operated do not materially change these results. Information on the prev-
alence of missing installation dates is provided in Table A1.
23 The decline in absolute release rates at continuously operated facilities in Indiana and Illinois
(presumably) results from periodic replacement of old tanks with new tanks, since new tanks are
constructed to higher leak-prevention standards (see Section 3.1).
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Table 8
Tanks in Service at Continuously Operated Facilities, 1990–2003
Michigan Illinois Indiana
Michigan/
Illinois
Michigan/
Indiana
Active tanks per facility:
Pretransition (1990–94) 3.6 2.9 3.0 1.2 1.2
Posttransition (1996–2003) 3.1 2.9 3.1 1.1 1.0
Change (%) 16 1 3 15 18
Active tanks 120 years old per facility:
Pretransition (1990–94) 1.0 .5 .6 1.9 1.7
Posttransition (1996–2003) 1.0 .7 .7 1.5 1.5
Change (%) 0 31 15 23 13
Note. Values are annual averages. Ratios are calculated before rounding.
or replacement tanks and equipment, for many years before and after Michigan’s
policy change. That leaves three possible explanations for Michigan’s substantially
greater decline in release rates among these states’ continuously operated facil-
ities:
1. greater direct risk-reducing activity among facilities in Michigan, whether
through closing or replacing old tanks, relining existing tanks, improving main-
tenance practices, or making similar efforts,
2. greater nondisclosure of releases in Michigan after 1995, financial penalties
and insurer monitoring efforts notwithstanding, or
3. a change in the rate at which steel tanks corrode underground in Michigan
relative to other Midwest states, for other reasons.
Additional evidence favors explanation 1, as noted presently. Although we
cannot completely rule out explanation 2, we find it difficult to support for the
reasons discussed in Section 4.3: the facilities in Table 7 are long-term operators
at (presumably) profitable locations and therefore should have high opportunity
costs of violating release-reporting laws—including significant civil penalties and
potential denial of insurance coverage. We can identify no evidence (or reason)
to support explanation 3, which would seem to require a heretofore undocu-
mented change in Michigan’s geology—and in the same year as its insurance
reform.
As for explanation 1, some supporting (if limited) evidence is apparent at the
tank level. Table 8 shows that after 1995, the number of tanks in service at
continuously operated facilities in Michigan decreased 16 percent. In contrast,
the corresponding changes are close to zero in Illinois and Indiana. Continuously
operated facilities in Michigan thus reduced the number of tanks in service, in
absolute number and relative to adjacent states—as one would expect after their
tank insurance costs increased.
More pointedly, Table 8 shows the number of older tanks in service (per
facility) at continuously operated facilities. Prior to 1995, facilities in Michigan
had nearly twice as many tanks over 20 years old in service (per facility) than
Illinois. Michigan had 70 percent more older tanks than Indiana. The greater
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prevalence of older tanks in service helps explain Michigan’s higher initial release
rate (Tables 5–7). After 1995, this ratio declines by 23 percent relative to Illinois
and by 13 percent relative to Indiana. In sum, after Michigan’s policy change
the continuously operated facilities in Michigan closed not only more tanks
overall but disproportionately more of their older—and ostensibly more leak
prone—tanks than Illinois and Indiana.24
Interestingly, the proportion of active tanks more than 20 years old increased
in both Illinois and Indiana, but not in Michigan. This is consistent with increases
in new-tank installation costs during the 1990s (see Section 3.1) and the limited
incentive to replace old tanks under a public insurance system, relative to the
incentive to replace old tanks under the commercial insurance system adopted
in Michigan in 1995. Regarding the latter, some simple calculations are infor-
mative. Consider a commercially insured three-tank facility, which is the modal
size, with tanks that are 25 years old. The data in Table 1 indicate that replacing
the tanks now—instead of 1 year hence—reduces the facility’s insurance pre-
mium by $3,300 this year ($1,380  $284 p $1,096 per tank). With 30-year-
old tanks, the savings exceed $4,200. For a continuously operating facility, ac-
celerating the tank system’s replacement to capture this benefit also entails a
cost, which is primarily the forgone interest on the nondeferred capital expense.
That can run several thousand dollars, but this cost is independent of the in-
surance system.25 Thus, the insurance savings benefit creates an economic in-
centive for commercially insured tank owners to replace their aging, potentially
leak-prone tanks proactively—perhaps after as little as 20–25 years of service.
Publicly insured owners face no similar incentive for precautionary behavior.
6.6. Selective Facility Attrition
The foregoing leaves open the possibility that part of Michigan’s greater overall
risk reduction is due to selective facility attrition. In precise terms, selective
attrition means facilities that ultimately closed in Michigan were more leak prone
(prior to closure) than facilities that closed in Illinois or Indiana:
24 There are two reasons that accidental releases are concentrated among older tanks. First, corrosion
takes time (years) to develop. Second, regulatory changes after 1989 required new tanks to meet
higher leak resistance standards. This means that there is a pure vintage effect that results in most
leaks occurring at older tank installations. On these points, the engineering literature is unequivocal:
a detailed study of the causes of accidental tank leaks at several hundred facilities in California
indicated that more than 75 percent of all leaks occurred in tanks (or piping systems) more than
15 years old (Couch and Young 2001). An independent study conducted for the Michigan Department
of Natural Resources (1995) reached similar conclusions, finding that tanks more than 20 years old
or of unknown age accounted for a disproportionate 64 percent of accidental tank releases.
25 The capital expense of removing and replacing tanks can vary widely with location and site
conditions; replacement timing is also sensitive to interest rates and leverage. For reasonable as-
sumptions ($100,000 project cost, 80 percent financed at 15 percent per annum via a 10-year term
commercial construction loan, a 3 percent per annum project inflation cost, and a 5 percent per
annum discount rate), the owner’s opportunity cost of accelerating tank replacement by 1 year is
approximately $2,700. The age-rated premiums in Table 1 imply that a facility owner’s commercial
insurance savings from replacing a (single-walled) tank system exceed the gain from deferral if the
tanks are 20 years old or older.
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Table 9
Release Rates at Attriting Facilities
Rate Michigan Illinois Indiana
Michigan/
Illinois
Michigan/
Indiana
Overall (1990–2003) 18.11 10.07 13.67 1.8 1.3
Pretransition (1990–94) 9.89 5.86 5.37 1.7 1.8
Posttransition (1996–2003) 24.25 13.41 19.59 1.8 1.2
Note. Values are annual averages for facilities closed by 2004. Release rates are per 100 active facilities.
P (R FA , ∼A ) 1 P (R FA , ∼A ), t ! 2004. (4)MICH ft ft f,2004 OtherState ft ft f,2004
Table 9 tabulates empirical frequencies that address expression (4). It reveals that
the facilities that ultimately closed in Michigan had significantly higher historical
release rates: more than 6 percentage points higher than those in Illinois and
4.5 percentage points higher than those in Indiana.
Note that these frequencies do not say how much selective attrition contributed
to the overall absolute risk reduction in Table 5. For this we require a more
detailed decomposition of the relative magnitudes.26
In principle, we can decompose a state’s absolute risk reduction into the release
rate changes at continuously operated facilities (stayers), facilities that ultimately
close (attritants), and new facilities (entrants), as weighted by their population
shares (s s, sa, and s e, respectively):
sDP(R )p s # DP(R Fstayer)ft ft (5)
a e s # DP(R Fattritant) s # DP(R Fentrant).ft ft
In this calculation, groups and population shares are time invariant: only the
conditional release rates are changing over time. (Population shares are defined
as a proportion of cumulative births through 2003.) The term in equationDP(R )ft
(5) is the change in a state’s total release rate from Table 5 (third column).
A few simple calculations imply that selective attrition accounts for at least
half of Michigan’s excess absolute risk reduction over adjacent states. Empirically,
the last term in equation (5) is negligible: there are few entrants, and their release
rates do not change much. The stayer share is in each state (Figure 2 at1ss ≈
3
2003), and Table 7 reports results for . It declines by 4.6 in Mich-DP(R d stayer)ft
igan versus 2.5 and 2.2 in Illinois and Indiana (per 100 facilities), respectively.
Thus, the first term on the right in equation (5) accounts for an excess absolute
risk reduction in Michigan over Illinois of about per 1001 # (4.6 2.5)p .7
3
facilities, which is half of Michigan’s excess absolute risk reduction (Table 5).
26 We also estimated survival curves for each state, with generally uninformative results. On the-
oretical grounds, the usefulness of survival modeling in this context is questionable: standard models
assume that transition probabilities vary with time at risk but are invariant with respect to calendar
time. This stationarity assumption does not hold here (because of vintage effects and changing tank
technical standards), which renders it unclear what distribution standard survival curves are esti-
mating.
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Table 10
Decomposition of Absolute Risk Reduction by Facility Duration Status, 1990–2003
All Attritants Stayers Entrants Unknown
Absolute risk reduction:a
Michigan 3.95 4.63 4.57 .31 2.98
Illinois 2.42 3.19 2.55 .06 1.18
Indiana 1.77 1.70 2.20 .17 2.49
Contribution of each group:b
Michigan 3.95 2.70 1.21 .01 .05
Illinois 2.42 1.91 .42 .00 .08
Indiana 1.77 1.03 .30 .01 .43
Share of excess absolute risk reduction (%):
Michigan  Illinois 51 51 1 2
Michigan  Indiana 76 42 0 17
Note. Unknown facilities are those operational in 2004 that cannot be definitively classified as entrants or
as stayers from 1990 to 2003 because of missing installation year data. These facilities include 2 percent
(Michigan), 7 percent (Illinois), and 17 percent (Indiana) of each state’s total (active and closed) facilities.
a Conditional release rate changes .DP(R d group)ft
b Share-weighted changes .groups # DP(R d group)ft
The remaining half is attributable to a greater reduction in release rates at attriting
facilities.
Table 10 steps through the detailed calculations. We include an additional
group of unknown facilities that are operational in 2004 but have missing entry
or installation dates (and thus cannot be unambiguously categorized as entrants
or stayers). The declines in absolute risk reductions are broadly similar for both
attritants and stayers, although there is some variation between states.
The attritants’ conditional release rates in the first three rows of Table 10 are
decreasing (negative absolute risk reductions), yet in Table 9 they are increasing
over time. They measure different things: Table 9 estimates ,P(R dA , ∼A )ft ft f,2004
while Table 10 shows changes in . Empirically,P(R d ∼A )ft f,2004
P(R d ∼A )p a P(R FA , ∼A ) negligible terms,ft f,2004 t ft ft f,2004
where is the proportion of facilities closing by 2004 that are still active at tat
! 2004. Over time, decreases faster than rises, and partic-a P(R dA , ∼A )t ft ft f,2004
ularly faster in Michigan. Michigan shuttered its comparatively more leak-prone
facilities faster after 1995 than adjacent states—which results in its greater post-
transition risk reduction among attritants.
The central panel of Table 10 presents each group’s conditional release rate
reduction weighted by its population share, corresponding to the product’s terms
on the right-hand side in equation (5). The share-weighted reduction in the
attritants’ release rates exceeds that of the continuously operated facilities for
each state and by a factor of 2 or more. This is not unexpected insofar as
approximately two-thirds of all facilities are attritants (Figure 2).
In Table 10, the bottom two rows show the result of subtracting each group’s
contribution and expressing the difference as a percentage of Michigan’s overall
excess risk reduction. This reveals that half of Michigan’s excess absolute risk
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reduction over Illinois is attributable to the greater risk reduction at continuously
operated facilities in Table 7. The balance is attributable to the fact that facilities
that ultimately closed in Michigan had higher historical release rates than did
closing facilities in Illinois. The proportions for Indiana are somewhat greater
for attritants and smaller for stayers. (Combining Indiana’s “unknown” group
with the stayers they may represent reduces the stayers’ contribution to about
one-quarter). As noted earlier, we view the comparisons to Indiana as generally
indicative, but less reliable, than results based on the higher quality data from
Illinois and Michigan.
We conclude that not only did ongoing establishments make greater risk-
reducing efforts in Michigan than in other states after 1995, but tank owners in
Michigan tended to permanently close facilities that had a higher propensity to
leak. Note that this second selective-attrition mechanism is not based on overall
facility closure rates, which the data indicate were similar in each state (Section
6.3). Rather, it attributes part of the differential change in total release rates
between Michigan and neighboring states to which facilities were closed. Greater
sorting of leak-prone tanks into closure in Michigan than in neighboring states
seems to be a particularly plausible result of the switch to private-market in-
surance, since tank attributes that predict future accidental releases (such as tank
age) are a major determinant of commercial insurance premiums.
7. Conclusions
This study shows that after Michigan’s transition to private-market environ-
mental liability insurance, overall accidental release rates from underground fuel
storage tank systems declined by more than 20 percent, or by about 1.5 releases
per 100 facilities, more than in adjacent states. This is a substantial change,
amounting to 3,000–4,000 fewer accidental releases over the following 8-year
period. At an average cleanup cost of approximately $125,000 per release, this
corresponds to aggregate avoided cleanup costs exceeding $400 million in that
state. Those are the direct costs of cleaning up affected sites and do not include
business interruption costs associated with cleanup activities. More important,
it also excludes the cost of any adverse health effects resulting from contaminated
water supplies. This is not because the public health consequences are apt to be
negligible but because studies of their magnitude remain few and their repre-
sentativeness is highly uncertain (see Jenkins, Kopits, and Simpson 2006).27
Are Michigan’s policy change and the adoption of risk-based insurance pricing
the only causes of Michigan’s greater decline in accidental release rates? We
believe that the best case, and one that may be particularly valuable given the
27 Simons, Bowen, and Sementeilli (1999) estimate that a leaking (commercial) underground storage
tank reduces the price of residential property within 1 block by 17 percent and reduces the price of
commercial property by 28–42 percent. Their study uses detailed data for 10 leaking gas station sites
in one Ohio county.
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policy implications, would be achieved by replication of these findings elsewhere.
Specifically, nine states have since followed Michigan’s lead in closing their state
fund assurance programs to new claims.28 Since federal financial responsibility
requirements are obligatory, this forces tank system owners to switch to com-
mercial environmental liability contracts like those in Michigan. If the main
findings that we report are confirmed independently for other states undertaking
similar insurance reforms, the policy ramifications would be compelling.
With the desirability of replication in mind, we proffer these policy ramifi-
cations. According to the State Financial Assurance Funds Survey (ASTSWMO
2007), eight states’ underground storage tank financial assurance funds are in-
solvent, with outstanding liabilities totaling $2 billion. Moreover, the EPA esti-
mates that 6,300 new underground fuel tank releases occur annually (EPA 2010,
p. 5). Adopting risk-based pricing structures similar to those studied here may
reduce the frequency of accidental releases and alleviate these ongoing solvency
crises. The potential is significant: a 20 percent reduction in release rates na-
tionally would reduce future cleanup expenses on the order of $1.5 billion over
the next decade.
We would be remiss not to observe parallels with other government assurance
programs, such as deposit insurance and pension benefit guaranty programs.
The fact that these programs are commonly subsidized with general tax revenue
and exclude risk-based pricing mechanisms can lead to two adverse outcomes.
First, moral hazard becomes a prominent concern. With pension benefit guaranty
funds, for example, Cooper and Ross (1999) argue that unions and firms may
have an incentive to agree to more lucrative employee retirement benefit packages
if the government will cover pension liabilities in the event of bankruptcy. Sim-
ilarly, banks and other financial intermediaries may take greater financial risks
than they would be willing to hold in the absence of federal deposit insurance
(see Kareken and Wallace 1978; Wheelock and Wilson 1995; but see Akerlof and
Romer 1993).29 The second shortcoming is that because participation in gov-
ernment assurance programs is usually subsidized, its existence may preclude
the development of private insurance markets that may identify more efficient
risk-reduction practices.
Several related questions remain for future research. First, this paper focuses
on an ex ante moral hazard problem, that is, whether a tank owner takes extra
risk-reduction efforts in response to risk-based pricing. There is also an ex post
moral hazard problem wherein a tank system owner has an incentive to exag-
gerate losses when making an insurance claim. Since a small but significant share
28 These states (and assurance fund discontinuation dates) are Wisconsin (1996), Texas (1998),
Florida (1999), West Virginia (2000), Iowa (2000), Delaware (2001), Alaska (2004), Arizona (2006),
and Maryland (2007).
29 One early policy change proposed to address moral hazard in this setting was to condition
federal deposit insurance premiums (paid by banks) on a measure of portfolio risk (Meltzer 1967).
According to this principle, the 1991 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (Pub.
L. No. 102–242, 105 Stat. 2236 [1991]) required the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to
implement a system in which each bank’s premium reflects the risk it poses to the insurance fund.
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of tank systems are self-insured under the private-market regime but few to
none are self-insured if a state assurance fund is available, it would be useful to
determine whether the ex post moral hazard problem is more severe with gov-
ernment assurance funds.
Last, there are hybrid public-private reinsurance arrangements. For example,
the state of Washington offers state-financed reinsurance at below-market prices
to commercial tank insurers. The commercial insurers are required to pass this
discount on to tank system owners. It would be desirable to know whether this
public-private system is as effective at reducing risk as the private insurance
market studied here.
Appendix
Installation and Closure Dates
This appendix summarizes the methods that we employ to address missing
data on tank and facility installation and closure dates. Missing transition dates
affect the calculation of release rates in equations (1) and (2) and the number
of facilities and active facilities reported in Figure 2. Table A1 indicates the extent
of missing installation and closure dates for each state. In general, if a tank’s
status (active or closed) is unknown, we estimate it with a probability of being
active that varies by tank and by year.
A1. Number of Active Facilities
To determine the number of active facilities, let i index tanks and f index
facilities. A tank is active between its installation year and closure year ,I Ci i
inclusive:
1 if I X t X Ci iT pit {0 otherwise.
A facility is active at t if it has at least one active tank:
1 if max {T }p 1i at f it
A pft {0 otherwise.
Figure 2 reports an estimate of
total number of active facilities in year tp A . (A1) ft
f
Difficulties arise if either or is unobserved for a tank at facility f. For suchI Ci i
facilities, we first estimate
ˆA p P(A p 1FQ )ft ft f
p P(max {T }p 1 dQ ),i at f it f
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Table A1
Prevalence of Missing Tank Installation and Closure Dates
Michigan Illinois Indiana
N % N % N %
Tanks active in 2004 24,002 27 20,125 24 16,537 30
Known installation date 22,582 25 16,499 19 10,728 19
Missing installation date 989 1 3,626 4 5,809 10
Tanks closed before 2004 66,006 73 65,201 76 39,518 71
Known installation and closure date 53,485 59 20,035 23 8,762 16
Known installation, missing closure date 32 0 3,909 5 398 1
Missing installation, known closure date 11,404 13 23,514 28 14,158 25
Missing installation and closure date 2 0 17,743 21 16,200 29
Observations 90,008 100 85,326 100 56,055 100
Note. Status in 2004 (active or closed) is known for all tanks. Data exclude tanks at facilities permanently
closed before 1986, when reporting requirements commenced. Percentages may not total 100.0 because of
independent rounding.
where denotes information available to us about facility f. We then replaceQf
with in equation (A1).ˆA Aft ft
A2. Estimating Active Status
For estimation of active status, let i p 1, 2, . . . , nf be an (arbitrary) enu-
meration of all tanks, both active and closed, at facility f. Then
ˆA p 1 P(T p 0, T p 0, . . . , T p 0FQ )ft 1t 2t n t ff
nf
p 1 P(T p 0FT p 0, . . . , T p 0, Q ) it i1,t 1t f
ip2
# P(T p 0FQ ).1t f
When is unobserved, we estimate its conditional probability using a stratifiedTit
matching procedure. Let be the event that all tanks with an index less thanTit
i are inactive at facility f, or
T p {T p 0, T p 0, . . . , T p 0}.it i1,t i2,t 1t
(If , let .) For notational convenience, setip 1 T p 0/it
p p P(T p 0FT , Q )it it it f
so . To estimate an unobserved facility’s status , weˆ ˆA p 1 p p . . . p Aft 1t 2t nft ft
require (an estimate of) for each tank. Here, t runs from 1990 to 2003, inpit
annual periods.
In the data, we observe every tank’s current (as of 2004) status. (Current
status, which matters for enforcement purposes, is recorded in the data even if
the installation and, if applicable, closure years are missing.) This implies that
if is recorded and either is recorded or 1 2004 (a right-censored survivalI C Ci i i
time), then is known and either zero or one, a degenerate case:pit
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Case 0. If is observed, and either is observed or 1 2004 (rightI C Ci i i
censored), then
0 if I X t X min{C , 2004}i ip pit {1 otherwise.
If a tank’s status is not directly observable, then it must be estimated, and one
of four mutually exclusive cases applies:
Case 1. If is unobserved and is observed (this implies that X 2004),I C Ci i i
then
p p P(T p 0FI unobserved, C , n , T )it it i i f it
P(I 1 tFI unobserved, C , n , T ), t ≤ Ci i i f it ip {1, t 1 C ,i
which we estimate with
ˆF(I 1 t d I observed, C , n , T ), t X Ci i i f it ipˆ pit {1, t 1 C ,i
where denotes the observed relative frequency of tanks with attributeˆF(Y dX)
Y in set X. Thus, if tank i at (say) a three-tank facility has an observed closing
year but an unknown installation date, then we estimate i ’s probability ofCi
active status in year t with the observed relative frequency of active status for
the ith tank at all three-tank facilities in which tank i ’s installation year is known,
tank i ’s closure year is the same ( ), and tanks 1 through ( ) are knownC i 1i
to be inactive in year t.
When a tank’s closing date is unknown, the generalization is straightforward:
Case 2. If is unobserved and 1 2004 (right censored), then, for t XI Ci i
2004,
p p P(T p 0FI unobserved, C 1 2004, n , T )it it i i f it
p P(I 1 tFI unobserved, C 1 2004, n , T ),i i i f it
which we estimate with
ˆpˆ p F(I 1 t d I observed, C 1 2004, n , T ).it i i i f it
Case 3. If is observed, is unobserved, and (not right cen-I C C ≤ 2004i i i
sored), then
p p P(T p 0FI , C unobserved, C X 2004, n , T )it it i i i f it
1, t ! Iip {P(C ! tFI , C unobserved, C X 2004, n , T ), t x I ,i i i i f it i
which we estimate with
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1, t ! Iipˆ pit ˆ{F(C ! t d I , C ≤ 2004, n , T ), t x I .i i i f it i
Case 4. If is unobserved, is unobserved, and (not rightI C C ≤ 2004i i i
censored), then for ,t ≤ 2004
p p P(T p 0FI unobserved, C unobserved, C X 2004, n , T )it it i i i f it
p 1 P(I X tX CFI unobserved, C unobserved, C ≤ 2004, n , T ),i i i i i f it
which we estimate with
ˆpˆ p 1 F(I X t X CFI observed, C observed, C X 2004, n , T ).it i i i i i f it
The fth summand in equation (A1) is then calculated as
nf
ˆ ˆA p 1 p .ft it
ip1
A3. Remark
As indicated in the main text, our procedure for estimating the number of
active facilities and other statistics dependent on tank status is reasonable if the
true (unknown) distribution of tanks’ installation and/or closure dates, given
current status (2004), is conditionally independent of whether the transition
dates were recorded in the data. Some support for this assumption comes from
our discussion with the database manager at the Illinois Office of the State Fire
Marshall, who indicated that a major reason for missing data is that the missed
information “may not have been processed yet.”30 This suggests that the distri-
bution of true installation and closure dates, given tanks with identical current
status (in 2004), may be similar regardless of whether it was recorded in our
data.
However, our analysis of the Indiana data seems to suggest there are too few
old tanks among the subgroup for which we have complete installation data.
This makes statistics involving active release rates and facility status for Indiana
suspect, and it is the reason that we are circumspect in reporting them in the
text.
A4. Total Number of Facilities
In Figure 2, the total number of facilities reported by year is the cumulative
number “born” on or before year t, or
N p 1(min {I } X t), (A2)t i at f i
f
where is the indicator function. The sum is over all facilities alive before t.1 (7)
30 Jan Spoor, database administrator, Illinois Office of State Fire Marshall, e-mail correspondence,
May 19, 2005.
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If the installation year is unobserved for tank i at facility f, then we replaceIi
the fth summand in equation (A2) with an estimate of
nf
P(min {I } X tFQ )p 1 P(I 1 tFI , Q )P(I 1 tFQ ),i at f i f i i f 1 f
ip2
where denotes the event that all tanks at facility f with an index less than iIi
were installed after year t, or
I p {I 1 t, I 1 t, . . . , I 1 t}.i i1 i2 1
When tank i ’s installation year is unobserved, the matching procedure that we
use to evaluate the installation conditional probabilities q { P(I 1 tFI , Q )i i i f
here is analogous to the procedure for estimating tanks’ active status probabilities.
Specifically,
Case 1. Closure year Ci is observed. (This implies that X 2004.) ThenCi
P(I 1 tFI , Q )p P(I 1 tFI unobserved, C , n , I ),i i f i i i f i
which we estimate with
ˆF(I 1 tFI observed, C , n , I ), t ! Ci i i f i iqˆ pi {0, t x C .i
Case 2. If 1 2004 (right censored), then for t ! 2004,Ci
P(I 1 tFI , Q )p P(I 1 tFI unobserved, C 1 2004, n , I ),i i f i i i f i
which we estimate with
ˆqˆ p F(I 1 tFI observed, C 1 2004, n , I ).i i i i f i
Case 3. If is unobserved and X 2004 (not right censored), thenC Ci i
P(I 1 tFI , Q )p P(I 1 tFI unobserved, C unobserved, C X 2004, n , I ),i i f i i i i f i
which we estimate with
ˆqˆ p F(I 1 tFI observed, C observed, C X 2004, n , I ).i i i i i f i
Last, we set equal to either one or zero, as appropriate, if tank i ’s installationqˆi
year is recorded in the data. The fth summand in equation (A2) is then calculated
as
nf
ˆ1 q . i
ip1
A5. Active Release Rates
To evaluate a state’s active release rate using equation (2), the denominator
requires the statistic in equation (A1), and the numerator requires the following:
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number of releases at active facilities (A3)
in year tp 1(R FA p 1), ft ft
f
where indicates a release at facility f in year t, and where is the indicatorR 1 (7)ft
function. If either or is unobserved for a tank at facility f, we replace theI Ci i
fth summand in equation (A3) with an estimate of . Since isP(R dA p 1) Aft ft ft
not directly observed in this case, we use Bayes’s rule,
P(R )ftP(R FA p 1)p P(A FR p 1),ft ft ft ftP(A )ft
which we evaluate using estimates of each term appearing on the right-hand
side:
Rft
ˆˆP(R FA p 1)p A ,ft ft Rft
ˆAft
where is the active status probability calculated earlier, is observed in theˆA Rft ft
data (it is either zero or one), and . We calculateˆ ˆA p P(A FR p 1, Q ) AR ft ft f Rft ft
using the same procedure for described above, with one minor modification:ˆAft
the tank-level probabilities in cases 0–4 are calculated among facilities withpit
releases only—that is, conditional on at t.R p 1ft
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